would enable *both* mathematics in particular *and* science in general to achieve *both* the immediately vivid evidence of intuition *and* the discursively rigorous evidence of deduction. Of course, there would also be corresponding implications for an accompanying conception of philosophy. At the same time, all this serves to allow the true red thread of the *Regulæ* to emerge in heightened relief, namely, the issue of which manner of evidencing is epistemically more basic – intuition or deduction.

Thus the fixed focus on evidence becomes most manifest in the tension, at least partially unresolved, between intuition and deduction, which are not, in the temporarily final analysis, two distinct and equally autonomous ways of knowing at all. Indeed, especially in philosophical discourse, both the Latin expression 'evidentia' and the English word 'evidence' are characterized by an essential equivocity. For, on the one hand, they relate to the direct, immediate, and intuitive insight into the truth of something, usually ideas; on the other hand, they refer to the indirect, mediated, and discursive procedure through which is procured insight into the truth of something, usually propositions. Some contemporary discussions of knowledge in the English language do not differentiate well enough to do justice to this distinction, to the point where it has become generally acceptable to speak of 'justification' (connotation: discursive) when 'evidence' (connotation: intuitive) would be more accurate. To be sure, evidence in the intuitive sense and evidence in the discursive sense can cooperate and thus contribute to knowledge of one and the same thing; none the less, this is no reason not to distinguish between them. Well aware of the linguistic and philosophical difficulties involved, Descartes distinguishes keenly and eventually concludes that, epistemically speaking, intuition is unequivocally more basic than deduction. For, once again, each operation has its own proper evidence. But the decisive consideration is that the certainty of intuition is understood as springing from a relationship of immediate presence between the knower and the known which is simply impossible to achieve by means of any significantly discursive deduction.

Here it is noteworthy that both the English expression 'evidence' and the Latin word 'evidentia' appear to derive etymologically from the Latin preposition 'ex', signifying 'from out of', as well as from the passive infinitive form of the verb 'videre', that is, 'videri', meaning 'to be seen' or 'to show (itself)': In the radical sense, then, what is 'evident' is that which shows itself from out of itself, and evidence is the showing of itself of that which shows itself from out of itself.[171] Thus evidence is, primarily and ultimately, not a thing, but rather a process. Also, the motion involved in evidence is that *from* that which is evident *to* the one to whom it is evident. Therefore, to the extent that the process of evidence is not itself immediate, it requires exactly what Descartes argues, that is, an accompanying continuous and uninterrupted movement of thought on the part of the one to whom or for whom that which is evidencing itself is supposed to become evident. In this respect, deduction necessarily remains inferior to

[171] Cf. *The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition* (Oxford, 1989), vol. V, pp. 469–470. Note well the difference between the verbal or dynamic and the substantive or static aspects of 'evidence', for it is even possible to use the English word as a verb, that is, 'to evidence'. Late Latin also had the passive form *evideri* in the sense of 'to be evident'.

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intuition, since the former involves a lower degree or grade or level of evidence and depends on the latter – as well as on induction – for supplementation.[172]

Therefore it also comes as no great surprise that the primary and ultimate concern of the *Regulæ* is to recommend how to make the most of one's native intelligence. As Descartes employs the term in the text, 'ingenium' conveys two basic ideas, namely, that of *intelligence* and that of the fundamentally *natural* character of the same. Taken together, these notions yield *innate genius*, understood as the cognitive power of the *whole* human being in *all* its manifestations. To be sure, there is no real English equivalent for the Latin, since 'genius', in the sense of a natural *intellectual* talent, is as close as it gets, and that is not nearly close enough, while 'ingenuity' is related, but utterly misleading. None the less, some of the derivative forms of the Indo-European root 'gen(e)-' do begin to express some of the intimately associated significations: kin, king, kind, gentle, general, generate, genius, engine, genuine, germ, genital, pregnant, nation, native, and nature.[173] Indeed, it is usually fairly difficult and sometimes almost impossible to decide whether to understand 'ingenium' in the 'facultative' sense of '*the* natural intelligence' or in a 'functional' sense as simply 'natural *intelligence*'. In any case, in establishing the significance of the term 'ingenium' for the *Regulæ*, it is worth bearing in mind that Descartes asserts that it is often necessary to ascribe unconventional meanings to traditional expressions in order to make oneself understood.[174]

Perhaps the easiest way to motivate potential readers' interest in Descartes' conception of 'intelligence' in the *Regulæ* is to point out how 'relevant' this text is to three – bracketing out the question of the relationship between natural intelligence and artificial intelligence[175] – contemporary debates about intelligence and its various aspects. In any case, to translate the title of the work as has been done here is inevitably to awaken certain associations of ideas that simply cannot be left unclarified.

First, there is the debate about what exactly *intelligence* is: On the one hand, there is the view that 'intelligence' consists of one identical factor. For example, Spearman, the father of modern psychometrics, posits an entity 'g', underlying and explaining all forms and expressions of intelligence, which has become known as 'Spearman's *g*', where '*g*' stands for *general intelligence*.[176] On the other hand, there is the view that 'intelligence' comprises many different factors. For example, Gardner, a leading cognitive psychologist, argues for '*multiple* intelligences'.[177] There is also Guilford's position

[172] This paragraph also shows why one must be very careful when using evidence in the legal sense, i.e., that which indicates the existence or non-existence of an alleged state of affairs or the truth or falsity of a statement given in testimony, to elucidate evidence in the properly epistemological sense. For evidence in the legal sense, which is 'evidence *for* or *against*', is not foundational, but rather derivative.

[173] Cf., e.g., 'Index of Indo-European Roots', *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, p. 2103, and *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 4 (Darmstadt, 1976), cols. 360–363.

[174] Cf., e.g., R. 3, § 6.

[175] Cf., e.g., Roger Penrose, *The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics* (Oxford, 1989), Daniel Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (New York/London, 1991), and Roger Penrose, *Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness* (Oxford, 1994).

[176] Cf., e.g., Charles Spearman (1863–1945), 'General Intelligence, Objectively Determined and Measured', *American Journal of Psychology*, vol. 15 (1904), pp. 201–293.

[177] Cf., e.g., Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (New York, 1983).

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